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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Olufemi Yussef Abdulai, a Nigerian national, petitions for 
review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA or Board) ordering him removed to his home country. 
His petition presents the important question whether the 
BIA may, consistent with existing law, sometimes r equire 
otherwise-credible applicants for asylum or withholding of 
removal to present evidence corroborating their stories in 
order to meet their burden of proof. Abdulai contends that 
it may not, but we conclude that it may. 
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We begin by clarifying that, absent special circumstances 
not present here, we review only decisions by the BIA and 
not those by immigration judges. We then explain why we 
reject Abdulai's other main argument--that the Board 
deprived him of due process of law by failing to conduct a 
sufficiently individualized assessment of his claim. Turning 
to the heart of the appeal, we explain why an examination 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the INA's 
implementing regulations, the United States' obligations 
under international law, and our own pr ecedent leads us to 
conclude that the BIA may sometimes requir e corroboration 
of otherwise-credible testimony. Despite this holding, 
because there is a serious question whether the Board's 
own rules were properly applied in this case, we vacate the 
BIA's order and remand this matter to per mit the Board to 
explain: (1) what aspects of Abdulai's narrative it would 
have been reasonable to expect him to corr oborate; (2) why 
the evidence he submitted failed to do so; and (3) why 
Abdulai's explanations of why he could not corr oborate 
certain aspects of his account were insufficient. 
 
I. 
 
A. Procedural History 
 
Abdulai arrived at New York's JFK airport in the spring of 
1998. Lacking a valid entry visa, he was taken into custody 
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS or 
Service). Shortly thereafter, the INS commenced a 
proceeding to allow it to remove Abdulai from the United 
States. At an initial hearing Abdulai conceded that he was 
"removable," i.e., that he was not entitled to remain in the 
United States absent some form of relief by the INS, but 
represented that he would be seeking both asylum from 
and withholding of removal to Nigeria based on political 
persecution. The case was continued to allow Abdulai to file 
the appropriate papers, which he timely did. 
 
A grant of asylum allows an otherwise-removable alien to 
stay in the United States. Subject to numerous exceptions 
not implicated in this case, the Attorney General "may 
grant asylum" to an alien he "determines" to be a "refugee" 
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within the meaning of the INA. 8 U.S.C. S 1158(b)(1). As 
relevant to this case, a person is a "r efugee" if he or she is 
"unable or unwilling" to return home "because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of . . . political opinion." Id.S 1101(42)(A). 
Withholding of removal, in contrast, confers only the right 
not to be deported to a particular country--not a right to 
remain in this one. See INS v. Aguirr e-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 
415, 419 (1999). Also subject to many exceptions not 
applicable here, the Attorney General may not remove an 
alien to a particular country if he "decides" that the alien's 
"life or freedom would be threatened in that country 
because of the alien's . . . political opinion." 8 U.S.C. 
S 1231(b)(3)(A). 
 
An Immigration Judge (IJ) conducted a hearing 
concerning Abdulai's application. Abdulai testified on his 
own behalf and offered documentary evidence describing 
conditions in Nigeria in support of his claim. At the close of 
the hearing, the IJ rendered an oral decision denying 
Abdulai's application and ordering him r emoved. The IJ did 
not expressly find that Abdulai's testimony lacked 
credibility, but nevertheless concluded that he had "not 
presented adequate evidence to demonstrate" eligibility for 
asylum or withholding of removal. The IJ also noted that 
General Sani Abacha--who had ruled Nigeria since seizing 
power in a coup in 1993--had died just four days before 
the hearing, and that "an issue of changed country 
conditions" had arisen as a result. Referring to the fact that 
"there have been some political changes in Nigeria," the IJ 
nevertheless determined that it was "much too premature to 
conclude that . . . the political atmosphere has changed in 
Nigeria so that a person who has a credible fear of 
returning to Nigeria would no longer have such fear." 
 
Abdulai then appealed to the BIA, which received a 
transcript of the hearing and a brief from Abdulai. The 
Board ultimately remanded the case to the IJ. Noting the 
recent changes in the Nigerian government, the BIA stated 
that "the record does not contain infor mation from which 
the Board would have been able to glean the import of the 
changes on [Abdulai's] claim." Accor dingly, the BIA ordered 
"the record . . . remanded to the Immigration Court so that 
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both parties . . . may have an opportunity to pr offer any 
evidence relevant to the applicant's claim and for the entry 
of a new decision by the Immigration Judge." The BIA also 
ordered that "[s]hould a decision on remand be adverse to 
the respondent, the record shall be certified to the Board 
for review." 
 
Consistent with the BIA's direction, the IJ then held 
another hearing. A witness for Abdulai testified that any 
changes in Nigeria following the death of General Abacha 
were nothing more than cosmetic dif ferences between it 
and the former government. Both Abdulai and the INS 
submitted documentary evidence about the transfer of 
power in Nigeria. The IJ again denied Abdulai's application 
by a written decision, reasoning that even if she were "to 
accept all of the [new] evidence presented by [Abdulai] in 
the worst possible light, [Abdulai] has submitted no 
evidence of any sort which relates to this Court's previous 
finding that [he] has not met his bur den of proof and 
persuasion do [sic] to the inadequacy of his testimony." 
Accordingly, the IJ once again found that Abdulai had 
"failed to meet the burden of proof and persuasion" and 
denied him both asylum and withholding of removal. The IJ 
also stated that she would "certify the r ecord to the BIA for 
review." Abdulai claims that he was not per mitted to 
submit an additional brief to the BIA, and it appears that 
no transcript of the February 24, 1999 hearing was ever 
prepared. The BIA denied Abdulai's r equest for oral 
argument. 
 
On January 18, 2000, the BIA entered a final order 
denying Abdulai's application, which was accompanied by a 
two-page per curiam opinion. The opinion noted that the IJ 
had denied Abdulai's application "primarily based on [his] 
failure to articulate a specific and detailed claim," and 
noted that on remand Abdulai had "pr ovided only general 
information as to the political situation in Nigeria, but 
again failed to demonstrate how he is adversely af fected by 
the change of government in Nigeria." Then, summarizing 
several of its previous decisions, the Boar d laid out the 
following rules: (1) an asylum seeker must always pr esent 
"general background information on country conditions;" 
and (2) "where it is reasonable to expect corroborating 
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evidence for certain alleged facts pertaining to the specifics 
of an applicant's claim, such information should be 
provided . . . [or] an explanation should be given as to why 
such information was not provided." The BIA stressed that 
the absence of corroboration or explanation in cases where 
it is reasonable to expect one or the other"can lead to a 
finding that the applicant has failed to meet his burden of 
proof." 
 
The Board's application of these principles to Abdulai's 
case was terse. It stated: 
 
       [W]e find that the respondent has not provided 
       sufficient evidence to meet his burden of pr oof. We 
       acknowledge that the respondent has submitted 
       numerous articles and reports regar ding general 
       country conditions in Nigeria. However, we note the 
       conspicuous lack of documentary evidence 
       corroborating the specifics of the respondent's 
       testimony. Therefore, given the complete lack of 
       evidence corroborating the specifics of the r espondent's 
       asylum claim, we agree with the Immigration Judge 
       that the respondent has failed to sustain his burden of 
       proof in this matter. 
 
Board Member Rosenberg dissented. She ar gued that 
Abdulai had "provided consistent, specific and detailed 
testimony, which establishe[d] that he pr eviously suffered" 
persecution "at the hands of the Nigerian authorities on 
account of his political opinion." Rosenber g also averred 
that the IJ had "misassessed the evidence factually when 
she concluded that [Abdulai's] testimony lacked specificity," 
and reasoned that the IJ had "applied an inappropriate 
legal standard in justifying her finding that[Abdulai] had 
not presented adequate evidence [i.e., the corroboration 
requirement]." Rosenberg also took issue with the manner 
in which the Board had dealt with Abdulai's case. She 
stated: 
 
       The fact remains that we never have engaged in review 
       of the respondent's . . . original appeal in a manner 
       that can be described as meaningful. Rather, in 
       denying the instant appeal, the majority, in a cursory 
       per curiam decision, simply affirms the Immigration 
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       Judge's original decision. The majority opinion does not 
       reflect that it meaningfully reviewed the decisions of 
       the Immigration Judge in relation to the r ecord, or that 
       it addressed the respondent's original appellate 
       arguments, or those made in connection with the 
       Immigration Judge's subsequent decision following our 
       remand order. In my view, the majority now sidesteps 
       our responsibility to conduct meaningful appellate 
       review by simply affirming the Immigration Judge's 
       decision without considering the record, de novo, or, at 
       the very least, addressing the arguments made by the 
       respondent in his original appeal. 
 
Abdulai timely filed a petition for review with this Court. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C.S 1252(a). 
 
B. Abdulai's Account and His Supporting Evidence 1 
 
On June 12, 1993, Nigerians voted in a presidential 
election. Despite the fact that Chief M.K.O. Abiola seems to 
have won, the results were annulled when General Abacha 
seized power in a coup. Abdulai--who had lived and worked 
in and around Lagos, Nigeria for his entir e life--was 
outraged by the coup. In November 1993 he joined and 
attended his first meeting of the Campaign for Democracy 
(CD), an organization seeking to restor e Nigeria to civilian 
rule. At some point he was issued a CD membership card. 
 
Abdulai did not attend another CD meeting, however , 
until February 1995. Abdulai provided no r eason for this 
fourteen month gap--a fact stressed by the IJ--nor did he 
explain what caused him to attend the February 1995 
meeting. At that meeting, a large number of activists 
gathered at the home of a CD organizer . The meeting was 
raided by Nigerian police officers, and Abdulai was arrested 
along with the president of the organization and other 
prominent CD members. He was imprisoned in a communal 
cell, but was never charged with an of fense, questioned by 
the police, or permitted to speak with anyone on the 
outside. After approximately two weeks, he was released 
without explanation. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Unless otherwise stated, the details of Abdulai's story are 
uncorroborated. 
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Abdulai resolved to become more involved with the CD. 
He attended another meeting in March 1995, wher e he 
volunteered to be a "Strategic Planner ." Strategic Planners 
distribute pamphlets, hang posters, and "generally mak[e] 
people aware" of CD's activities. Then, on June 12, 1995, 
Abdulai participated in a rally held to commemorate the 
two year anniversary of the 1993 elections. The police 
arrived, fired tear gas into the crowd, and arrested Abdulai 
while he was handing out pamphlets. He did not know how 
many people had been at the June 12 rally, nor did he 
know how many people had been arrested that day. During 
his second stint in prison, Abdulai was told that he was 
being confined pursuant to Decree Number Two of 1984, 
and that he would be charged with distributing seditious 
materials and unlawful gathering. The guards also took his 
CD membership card. Two months later, Abdulai was 
released when his family succeeded in bribing his captors. 
 
After his release, Abdulai's family convinced him to drop 
out of the CD because they feared for his safety. He stopped 
attending CD meetings, abandoned his position as a 
Strategic Planner, and destroyed all his CD materials. 
Nevertheless, in June 1996, Abdulai was again taken into 
custody, this time by the Nigerian State Security Services. 
He was questioned for several hours about an upcoming 
CD rally, and placed in a cell. He was questioned three 
additional times over a four month period and then 
released. 
 
Abdulai was arrested a final time in either late November 
or early December of 1996 by agents of the Dir ectorate of 
Military Intelligence. The agents ransacked his apartment 
and took him to their barracks. Abdulai was questioned 
about an explosion in Lagos and his relationship to other 
activists, but told the officers that he was no longer a 
member of the CD. During the questioning, officers slapped 
Abdulai and "stomped on his ear." He was then placed in a 
cell. Abdulai was later told that he would be r eleased if he 
signed a document incriminating other activists. He signed 
the document, after which his conditions of confinement 
improved. 
 
Abdulai fell ill sometime around March 1997 and was 
released in May of that year. After being treated by a doctor, 
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he fled to Benin. He stayed there until Mar ch 1998, when 
several of his friends who had traveled to Nigeria to 
participate in a rally were arrested. Abdulai became 
convinced that the Nigerian police now knew his 
whereabouts (and, presumably, that they would hunt him 
down in Benin). A friend arranged for him to be smuggled 
from Benin to Togo to Ghana to the Ivory Coast, and, 
finally, to the United States. 
 
Abdulai tendered a considerable amount of documentary 
evidence in support of his account. In addition to a large 
amount of background material concerning conditions in 
Nigeria, he also submitted: (1) his Nigerian passport; (2) a 
letter from the General Counsel of the National Democratic 
Council, an umbrella organization supporting democracy in 
Nigeria, which stated that his story "appear[ed] very 
credible in relation to the types of cases we are aware of " 
but that "[b]ecause of the massive clamp-down on civil 
society in Nigeria, efforts to independently verify or confirm 
membership [in pro-democracy groups] are usually fruitless 
from this end and dangerous from the Nigerian end;" and 
(3) an affidavit from an assistant pr ofessor of African 
Studies and Politics who had visited Nigeria and written 
about the political situation there. The pr ofessor opined 
that Abdulai's account was "consistent with the current 
political conditions in Nigeria." 
 
II. 
 
We must first clarify whether we review only the decisions 
of the BIA or those of both the IJ and the BIA. Though this 
Court appears never to have spoken on this pr ecise issue, 
there is widespread consensus among our sister circuits. 
Congress has granted us power to review only "final order[s] 
of removal." 8 U.S.C. S 1252(a)(1). Because an alien facing 
removal may appeal to the BIA as of right, and because the 
BIA has the power to conduct a de novo r eview of IJ 
decisions, there is no "final order" until the BIA acts. See 
Castillo-Rodriguez v. INS, 929 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1991). 
Accordingly, we now expressly hold that the "final order" we 
review is that of the BIA. Accord 3 Charles Gordon et al., 
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Immigration Law & Procedure P 34.02[14][a], at 34-61 
(2000).2 
 
III. 
 
Abdulai contends that the BIA denied him due pr ocess by 
failing to make an individualized determination of his 
interests. He specifically faults the Boar d for not 
acknowledging or addressing any of his ar guments.3 
 
Despite the fact that there is no constitutional right to 
asylum, aliens facing removal are entitled to due process. 
See Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 1990). "The 
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity 
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner." Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. There are some situations in which a court of appeals effectively 
reviews an IJ's decision, but this is not one of them. The vast majority 
of the courts of appeals have held that the BIA"may simply state that 
it affirms the IJ's decision for the r easons set forth in that decision." 
Chen v. INS, 87 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir . 1996) (citing cases from the Second, 
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits). In such 
cases, the IJ's opinion effectively becomes the BIA's, and, accordingly, a 
court must review the IJ's decision. See id . at 7 n.3. The BIA may 
disregard an IJ's factual findings and conduct a de novo review of the 
entire record, but it is also entitled to defer to an IJ's fact-finding 
(assuming, of course, that the IJ's conclusions ar e supported by the 
evidence). See Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F .3d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 1998). 
When the BIA defers to an IJ, a reviewing court must, as a matter of 
logic, review the IJ's decision to assess whether the BIA's decision to 
defer was appropriate. In this case, the BIA never expressly "adopted" 
any portion of the IJ's opinion or announced that it was deferring to any 
of the IJ's findings. We therefor e review only the BIA's decision. 
 
3. Abdulai also claims that the BIA was r equired to conduct a de novo 
review of the entire record. W e find this claim meritless. First, we have 
squarely held that the BIA may defer to an IJ's factual findings. See 
Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 1998). In such cases, the 
BIA obviously does not review de novo. Second, the case on which 
Abdulai relies, Charlesworth v. USINS, 966 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1992), 
simply does not support his argument. Charlesworth stated that the BIA 
"has the power to conduct a de novo review of the record." Id. at 1325 
(emphasis added) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Having the 
power to do something and being required to do it are not the same 
thing. 
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(quotation marks and citation omitted). In adjudicative 
contexts such as this one, due process r equires three 
things. An alien: (1) is entitled to "factfinding based on a 
record produced before the decisionmaker and disclosed to" 
him or her, Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1096 
(10th Cir. 1994); (2) must be allowed to make arguments on 
his or her own behalf, see id.; and (3) has the right to "an 
individualized determination of his [or her] interests," id. 
(citing Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26, 34 (7th Cir. 
1992)). Because Abdulai does not contend that the decision 
to exclude him was based on evidence that was kept secret 
from him, or that he was prevented fr om making his case 
to the BIA or the IJ, the only due process right potentially 
implicated in this case is the third one--the right to an 
"individualized determination."4 
 
A decisionmaker must "actually consider the evidence 
and argument that a party presents." Id. This Court has 
suggested that the BIA denies due process to an alien when 
it "act[s] as a mere rubber-stamp." Marincas v. Lewis, 92 
F.3d 195, 202 n.7 (3d Cir. 1996). But because "[a]gency 
action . . . is entitled to a presumption of r egularity," 
Abdulai bears the burden of proving that"the BIA did not 
review the record when it consider ed the appeal." McLeod v. 
INS, 802 F.2d 89, 95 n.8 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
We are troubled by certain aspects of this case. It 
appears that no record of the February 24, 1999 remand 
hearing was ever transmitted to the Board. 5 Moreover, 
though the BIA faulted Abdulai for not submitting"evidence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Though Abdulai complains that he was not allowed to file an 
additional brief with the BIA following the r emand, he concedes that he 
submitted one during his first appeal to that body. Because the Board's 
decision was based on Abdulai's failure to corr oborate the specifics of 
his 
story, and because Abdulai concedes that no evidence going to that issue 
was presented at the remand hearing, we conclude that the BIA's refusal 
to allow him to submit an additional brief worked no due process 
violation. 
 
5. The BIA denied Abdulai's application because he had failed to 
corroborate the specifics of his narrative. Because he concedes that none 
of the evidence presented at the remand hearing qualified as such 
corroboration, we conclude that the failur e to include the evidence in 
the 
administrative record, though error , was harmless. 
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corroborating the specifics of [his] testimony," it failed to 
acknowledge or respond to Abdulai's arguments that he 
had corroborated certain portions of his testimony and that 
it was unreasonable to expect him to corr oborate others. 
 
That being said, the question for due process purposes is 
not whether the BIA reached the corr ect decision; rather, it 
is simply whether the Board made an individualized 
determination of Abdulai's interests, and we believe that its 
opinion contains sufficient indicia that it did so. The BIA 
stated that: "This matter was remanded to the Immigration 
Judge for further inquiry as to the changed country 
conditions of Nigeria, particularly since the gover nment 
that ruled in Nigeria at the time the respondent alleges he 
suffered persecution was no longer in power." It then noted 
that: "The Immigration Judge found that the r espondent 
only provided a large amount of evidence concerning 
general claims as to the unrest in Nigeria, but failed to 
include evidence specific to his claim, such as evidence of 
his membership in a political party." The BIA further 
observed that: "[O]n remand, the r espondent provided only 
general information about the political situation in Nigeria, 
but again failed to demonstrate how he is adversely affected 
by the change in government in Nigeria." 
 
From these statements, one can deduce that the BIA was 
aware that Abdulai was a Nigerian seeking asylum on the 
basis of political persecution, that there had been issues 
involving a change in the Nigerian government and his 
failure to document his membership in a political party, 
and that the IJ's decision evinced dissatisfaction with his 
meeting the requisite burden of pr oof. This is sufficient. 
See, e.g., Rhoa-Zamora, 971 F.2d at 35-36 (finding no due 
process violation in a case where the BIA had noted that 
the applicant's " `testimony concer ning the military round- 
up of young males, like himself, in Nicaragua,' " and had 
made "an explicit finding that [two particular State 
Department Reports] which [the applicant] claimed that the 
Immigration Judge improperly prevented him from 
submitting, `do not establish his present eligibility for either 
withholding of deportation or asylum.' " (quoting the BIA)). 
 
The instant matter is distinguishable from the only 
immigration case Abdulai cites in which a court found a 
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due process violation: the Tenth Cir cuit's decision in Llana- 
Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir . 1994). In that 
case, "[w]ith the exception of the first footnote (in which the 
BIA declined to address whether Petitioners hadfirmly 
resettled in Honduras), the BIA's decision contain[ed] no 
indication that it had undertaken a particularized 
consideration of Petitioners' case." Id. at 1098 (emphasis 
added). Because the BIA's opinion evidences its 
consideration of the individualized circumstances of 
Abdulai's application, we find no due process violation here. 
 
IV. 
 
We now come to the heart of the appeal. Though never 
finding that his testimony lacked credibility, the BIA held 
that Abdulai had not met his burden of pr oof due to his 
failure to introduce evidence corr oborating the specifics of 
his account.6 In so doing, the BIA applied its holding in In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. At oral argument, counsel for the Service suggested that a BIA finding 
that an applicant has failed to meet her bur den of proof necessarily 
encompasses a conclusion that the applicant's account was not credible. 
This is contrary to the Board's cases. In r e S-M-J-, Interim Decision 
3303 
(BIA 1997), available at 1997 WL 80984, explained the difference: 
 
       Even if an alien is found to be credible, if there is no context 
within 
       which to evaluate her claim, she has failed to met her burden of 
       proof because she has not provided sufficient evidence of the 
       foundation of her claim. A failure of pr oof is not a proper ground 
per 
       se for an adverse credibility determination. The latter finding is 
more 
       appropriately based upon inconsistent statements, contradictory 
       evidence, and inherently improbable testimony. 
 
(emphasis added). In other words, the BIA views"credibility" as involving 
only an analysis of the internal consistency and plausibility of an 
applicant's claim, whereas burden of pr oof analysis also involves 
consideration of all the surrounding evidence (or lack thereof). 
 
Abdulai avers that we must assume that his testimony was deemed 
credible because neither the BIA nor the IJ ever explicitly found to the 
contrary. We acknowledge that such a rule pr evails in the Ninth Circuit, 
see, e.g., Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000), but 
Abdulai points to no decision of this Court expr essly adopting such a 
rule. Because it does not affect our disposition of this matter, we will 
assume, without deciding, that Abdulai's testimony was credible. 
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re S-M-J-, Interim Decision 3303 (BIA 1997), available at 
1997 WL 80984. S-M-J- established the following rules: (1) 
an applicant need not provide evidence corr oborating the 
specifics of his or her testimony unless it would be 
"reasonable" to expect the applicant to do so; but (2) if it 
would be "reasonable" to expect corr oboration, then an 
applicant who neither introduces such evidence nor offers 
a satisfactory explanation as to why he or she cannot do so 
may be found to have failed to meet his or her bur den of 
proof. Abdulai challenges both the BIA's authority to adopt 
this rule and its application in his case. W e conclude that: 
(1) the Board's rule is not per se invalid; but (2) because the 
BIA's decision in this case provides us with no way to 
conduct our (albeit limited) review, we will vacate its order 
and remand to allow it to explain in mor e detail its reasons 
for denying Abdulai's application. We note that, except with 
regard to our discussion of this Court's prior cases, see 
infra at pp. 17-19, our analysis as to both points tracks in 
considerable measure that contained in Judge W alker's 
persuasive opinion in Diallo v. INS, 232 F .3d 279 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
 
A. 
 
We begin by acknowledging the narrow scope of our 
review. The Attorney General has been"charged with the 
administration and enforcement" of the INA, and Congress 
has provided that his "determination[s] and ruling[s] . . . 
with respect to all questions of law shall be controlling." 8 
U.S.C. S 1103(a)(1). Because of this delegation, the Supreme 
Court has held that "principles of Chevr on deference are 
applicable" in the immigration context. INS v. Aguirre- 
Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999). The Court has also 
emphasized that--because of the area's pr ofound foreign 
policy implications--"judicial deference to the Executive 
Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration 
context." Id. at 425. And because the Attorney General has 
vested the BIA with the power to exercise the"discretion 
and authority conferred upon [him] by law," see 8 C.F.R. 
S 3.1(d)(1) (2000), these principles of defer ence also apply to 
the BIA. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425. 
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In determining whether the BIA may sometimes r equire 
corroboration of otherwise-credible testimony, we begin 
with the language of the INA. We accor d Chevron deference 
to the BIA's interpretations of the statute. See id. Our 
inquiry, therefore, is limited to deter mining whether "the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue," and, if so, "whether the agency's answer is based on 
a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843 (1984). 
 
The INA is completely silent as to whether, when it is 
reasonable to expect corroborating evidence, an otherwise- 
credible applicant who neither produces such corroboration 
nor adequately explains his or her failure to do so may be 
deemed to have failed to meet his or her bur den of proof. 
See Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting 
the INA's silence on this issue). The statute simply says 
that a person is eligible for asylum "if the Attorney General 
determines that such alien is a refugee," 8 U.S.C. 
S 1158(b)(1), and that the Attorney General must grant 
withholding relief if he "decides that the alien's life or 
freedom would be threatened" in the alien's home country, 
id. S 1231(b)(3)(A). What the statute says nothing about, 
however, is whether the Attorney General may sometimes 
require corroboration or explanation in determining 
whether an alien is a refugee or deciding whether the 
alien's life or freedom would be threatened in his or her 
home country. Because the statute is silent, ther efore, the 
question is whether the BIA's interpretation is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute. In light of the INA's 
enormously broad delegation to the Attor ney General, we 
would be extremely reluctant to hold that his interpretation 
is unreasonable. 
 
In support of Abdulai's position, amicus Lawyer's 
Committee for Human Rights invokes two regulations 
promulgated by the Attorney General, one dealing with 
asylum and the other with withholding of removal. Both 
regulations provide that "[t]he testimony of the applicant, if 
credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof 
without corroboration." 8 C.F.R.S 208.13(a) (2000); Id. 
S 208.16(b). Amicus argues that these regulations establish 
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that the BIA may never require an applicant to corroborate 
otherwise credible testimony as a precondition for meeting 
his or her burden of proof. We disagree. 
 
First, our standard of review is even mor e deferential 
when an agency is interpreting a regulation rather than a 
statute that it administers. See Applebaum v. Nissan Motor 
Acceptance Corp., 226 F.3d 214, 218 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(noting this distinction). An agency's interpr etation of its 
own regulation is "controlling . . . unless it is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." Bowles v. 
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). But 
even setting aside the hefty deference to which the BIA is 
entitled, we conclude that amicus' r eading is contrary to the 
language of the regulation. The regulation states that 
credible testimony may be enough to meet the applicant's 
burden of proof. Saying that something may be enough is 
not the same as saying that it is always enough; in fact, 
the most natural reading of the word "may" in this context 
is that credible testimony is neither per se sufficient nor per 
se insufficient. In other words, "it depends." And, according 
to the BIA, it depends, at least in part, on whether it would 
be reasonable to expect corroboration. W e do not see how 
this construction is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 
the regulation. 
 
Amicus also invokes the United States' tr eaty obligations 
pursuant to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. The Protocol forbids any "contracting State" from 
expelling "a refugee in any manner whatsoever where his 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his . . . 
political opinion." 1967 United Nations Pr otocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T . 6224, 
6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577. Amicus notes that a Handbook 
published by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees states that "the r equirement of 
evidence should . . . not be too strictly applied in view of 
the difficulty of proof inherent in the special situation in 
which an applicant for refugee status finds himself." See 
Amicus Br. at 19 (quoting Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Pr ocedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
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Refugees 197 (Geneva 1992) (the Handbook)). Accordingly, 
the Handbook recommends that "if the applicant's account 
appears credible, he should, unless ther e are good reasons 
to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt." Amicus 
Br. at 20 (quoting the Handbook). 
 
Amicus' argument suffers fr om two fatal flaws. First, the 
Handbook is not binding on the INS or American courts. 
See, e.g., Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 427. Second, the 
Handbook only recommends not requiring corroborating 
evidence "unless there are good r easons to the contrary." 
But because the BIA's rule only holds a failur e to 
corroborate against an applicant when: (1) it is "reasonable 
to expect" corroboration; and (2) the applicant has no 
satisfactory explanation for not doing so, "[t]he standard 
applied by the BIA adheres to [the Handbook's] general 
parameters," Diallo v. INS, 232 F .3d 279, 286 (2d Cir. 
2000). We find nothing in the Handbook that renders the 
BIA's rule suspect on its face. 
 
Abdulai presses a final claim based on stare decisis: He 
argues that this Court's precedent establishes that credible 
testimony is always sufficient to meet an applicant's burden 
of proof. The BIA is required to follow court of appeals 
precedent within the geographical confines of the relevant 
circuit. See Matter of Anselmo (Interim Decision), 20 I.&N. 
Dec. 25. 30-31 (May 11, 1989) (acknowledging this fact). 
And this panel is, of course, bound by the decisions of a 
prior panel. See 3d Cir. I.O.P . 9.1. Accordingly, if prior 
Third Circuit law establishes that an applicant's credible 
testimony is always sufficient to meet the bur den of proof, 
then the BIA was not permitted to requir e corroboration in 
this case and we must set aside the BIA's decision. Cf. 
Ladha, 215 F.3d at 899 (following this logic based on Ninth 
Circuit precedent).7 
 
We disagree with Abdulai, however , that our cases have 
established the rule that he seeks. Abdulai places most 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In support of this argument, Abdulai and amicus cite numerous cases 
from other courts of appeals. Because we ar e not bound by precedent 
from other circuits and because we have concluded that only stare 
decisis could justify a ruling in Abdulai's favor, these decisions are not 
relevant to our disposition here. 
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emphasis on our decision in Senathirajah v. INS , 157 F.3d 
210 (3d Cir. 1998).8 At one point in its opinion, the panel 
stated that: "corroboration is not r equired to establish 
credibility. The law allows one seeking r efugee status to 
prove his persecution claim with his own testimony if it is 
credible." Id. at 216 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Abdulai submits that this language clearly establishes that 
the BIA may not hold that an applicant has failed to meet 
his or her burden of proof simply because he or she has 
failed to produce corroborating evidence. Because we 
assume (for the sake of argument) that Abdulai's testimony 
was credible, see supra note 6, the sentence upon which he 
must be relying is the second one: "The law allows one 
seeking refugee status to prove his persecution claim with 
his own testimony if it is credible." The pr oblem for 
Abdulai, however, is that this statement was dicta. 
 
The issue before us in Senathirajah simply had nothing 
to do with corroboration. That case involved an asylum 
applicant from Sri Lanka. See id. at 211. An IJ originally 
denied the application on several grounds. Importantly, the 
IJ found that the applicant's story had not been cr edible 
and also concluded that he had failed to meet his burden 
of proof because he had not corroborated his story. See id. 
at 213-14. The applicant then appealed to the BIA, which 
"conducted an independent examination of the r ecord, and 
also concluded that Senathirajah was not credible." Id. at 
216. The BIA gave three reasons for concluding that the 
applicant lacked credibility--none of which involved his 
failure to provide corroboration. See id. at 216-17. Because 
we review only the BIA's decision, see supra page 9-10, 
there was simply no issue of corroboration before us in 
Senathirajah. This is confirmed by the fact that, other than 
the sentence from which Abdulai and amicus  seek to 
extract so much meaning, our analysis in Senathirajah 
contained no discussion of the corroboration issue. Though 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. He also cites Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 1998), 
but that case simply states that "[w]hen documentary evidence is lacking 
. . . the applicant's credible, persuasive, and specific testimony may 
suffice." 143 F.3d at 165 (emphasis added). We return once again to a 
point we made earlier: saying that something may  suffice is not the same 
as saying that it always does. 
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we agree that Senathirajah suggests that it may be a bad 
idea to expect asylum applicants to provide corroborating 
evidence, that issue simply was not before us. 
 
In sum, we have no warrant for concluding that the BIA's 
rule is per se invalid. The Board's rule is not foreclosed by 
the INA or the governing regulations, it is consistent with 
international standards, and it is not in conflict with our 
cases. We therefore hold that the BIA may sometimes 
require otherwise-credible applicants to supply 
corroborating evidence in order to meet their burden of 
proof. 
 
B. 
 
Our consideration is not ended, however, simply because 
we have concluded that the BIA's rule is not per se invalid. 
There remains the question whether it was properly applied 
here. The BIA's rule contemplates a thr ee-part inquiry: (1) 
an identification of the facts for which "it is reasonable to 
expect corroboration;" (2) an inquiry as to whether the 
applicant has provided information corr oborating the 
relevant facts; and, if he or she has not, (3) an analysis of 
whether the applicant has adequately explained his or her 
failure to do so. See In re S-M-J-, Interim Decision 3303 
(BIA 1997), available at 1997 WL 80984. 
 
In this case, the BIA seems to have focused on inquiry (2) 
(whether Abdulai had corroborated the specifics of his 
testimony), while completely ignoring the other two aspects 
of its own test. The Board's entire analysis reads: 
 
       In the case at bar, we find that the r espondent has not 
       produced sufficient evidence to meet his bur den of 
       proof. We acknowledge that the r espondent has 
       submitted numerous articles and reports r egarding 
       general country conditions in Nigeria. However , we note 
       the conspicuous lack of documentary evidence 
       corroborating the specifics of the respondent's 
       testimony. Therefore, given the complete lack of 
       evidence corroborating the specifics of the r espondent's 
       asylum claim, we agree with the Immigration Judge 
       that the respondent has failed to sustain his burden of 
       proof in this matter. 
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What the BIA never explains, however, is what  particular 
aspects of Abdulai's testimony it would have been 
reasonable to expect him to have corroborated. Without 
knowing that, it is impossible for us to review: (1) whether 
it was reasonable to expect Abdulai to corr oborate such 
information; (2) whether Abdulai provided the requisite 
corroboration; or (3) whether Abdulai adequately explained 
his inability to do so. 
 
Nor is this an academic exercise. The BIA's own prior 
decisions establish that it is "reasonable" to expect an 
applicant to corroborate "facts which ar e central to his or 
her claim and easily subject to verification." In re S-M-J-, 
supra. It has included in this category "evidence of [an 
applicant's] place of birth, media accounts of large 
demonstrations, evidence of a publicly held office, or 
documentation of medical treatment." Id. The Board has 
also stated that it is generally reasonable to expect 
applicants to produce letters from family members 
remaining in the applicant's home country. See In re M-D-, 
Interim Decision 3339 (BIA 1998), available at  1998 WL 
127881.9 
 
Abdulai attempted to meet his burden under these rules. 
He submitted his Nigerian passport, and attempted to 
explain his inability to document his CD membership. At 
oral argument before this Court, the Service submitted that 
it is reasonable to expect Abdulai to have corr oborated his 
hospital visit in Nigeria following his final r elease from 
confinement. Though we are uncertain whether it would be 
reasonable to hold Abdulai's failure to pr ocure Nigerian 
hospital records against him (assuming, of course, that 
such records even exist), that concer n is ultimately beside 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In setting out this summary of the Boar d's case law, we express no 
opinion as to whether we agree that it is "r easonable" to expect 
applicants for asylum or withholding of removal to corroborate these 
types of information. We observe, however, that an applicant's ability to 
obtain corroborating evidence may often depend on the social and 
political circumstances of a given country. See, e.g., Asylum and 
Withholding of Deportation Procedur es, 52 Fed. Reg. 32552, 32553 
(proposed March 7, 1991) ("[T]heflight or defection of a bona fide refugee 
from a country that engages in widespread persecution may leave him in 
a difficult position to corroborate his claim."). 
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the point. Because the BIA never stated which aspects of 
his story it would have been reasonable to corr oborate, we 
have no way of reviewing the Board's actual reasoning. 
 
We acknowledge that our standard of r eview is 
extraordinarily deferential to the BIA, and that nothing in 
the INA specifically requires the Boar d to explain its 
decisions. But the availability of judicial r eview (which is 
specifically provided in the INA) necessarily contemplates 
something for us to review. In a case quite similar to this 
one, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded a decision 
by the BIA so that the Board could further explain its 
reasoning. See Diallo v. INS, 232 F .3d 279, 288-90 (2d Cir. 
2000). We have done the same when deficiencies in BIA 
decisions have made them impossible to review 
meaningfully. See, e.g., Sotto v. USINS, 748 F.2d 832, 837 
(3d Cir. 1984). Because the BIA's failur e of explanation 
makes it impossible for us to review its rationale, we grant 
Abdulai's petition for review, vacate the Boar d's order, and 
remand the matter to it for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
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